An important issue in the life sciences industries concerns the nature of the incentive mechanism that should govern the production of innovation within this R&D sector. We look at the specic problem of coordinating the supply of inputs across very dierent agentsNorth and Souththat must each supply inputs in order to generate innovations from the industry. The current arrangement in this industry provides for a single property right at end of the pipeline, i.e. where marketing of the innovation occurs. This property rights scenario raises two problems, one of eciency and one of equity. The key question asked here pertains to the number and placement of property rights that should be instituted to address this property rights failure. Should one establish new property rights in traditional knowledge alone; property rights in genetic information alone; or in both? We demonstrate that in a world in which traditional knowledge and genetic information are complements in the production of R&D, a resolution of the property rights failure in genetic information also may resolve the allocation failure in traditional knowledge even in the absence of a distinct property right. The reason is that traditional knowledge of the nature of private information is comparable to a trade secret. Traditional knowledge holders may use this informational advantage to improve their benet by capturing some informational rent. A new property right is important to enable bargaining and coordination to occur across the industry, but a single property right is probably sucient to enable coordination between the two agents.
We don't want to forbid companies from using our genetic resources or traditional knowledgebut they have to reward the indigenous people fairly , Andrés Valladolid (Peruvian National Commission Against Biopiracy).
Introduction
The life sciences industries provide an interesting example of the need for global cooperation in the management of an important natural resource, i.e. biodiversity. For biodiversity to provide continuing inputs into human welfare requires cooperation between the life sciences rms developing marketable products in countries with large markets for pharmaceuticalsthe Northand the rms/communities in countries hosting the genetic resources and/or traditional knowledge where the information is foundthe South. The host country provides basic or pure information on potential solution concepts, while the R&D rm supplies the practical capabilities for developing these solution concepts into marketable compounds and products. In this manner primary biological information is generated and channelled from a primary producer through a secondary R&D sector in order to then become commercial products capable of addressing consumer needs.
We have examined the need for global cooperation in the management of biodiversity elsewhere. (Gatti et al. 2011 ) In this paper, we examine the manner in which private industry could be an important part of the process by which such cooperation might be engendered. The ows of value that should reach the providers of important inputs can be as readily channelled by private rms as by public entities, if an appropriate property right structure is put into place. The need for public sector involvement generally ows from a private property right failure, if one such exists.
There is a lot of evidence that property right failures do inhere in this industry. The bitter and lengthy disputes over derivatives of the Neem tree and maca extracts are illustrative of this situation. In the infamous Neem tree cases (Shiva 1996; Bullard 2005 ), a coalition of NGOs has challenged the patents held by US rm W.R. Grace both in the US Patent Oce (US PTO) and the European Patent Oce (EPO) invoking lack of novelty. The inventions, it is alleged, were simply extensions of traditional processes used for millennia for making neembased products in India.
1 Recently, the Peruvian National Commission Against Biopiracy (supported by local rms and civil society organizations) has successfully challenged patents in the Japanese Patent Oce and in France for products largely based on Andean traditional knowledge. It is also preparing a legal challenge in US courts against the patent granted to the New Jersey company PureWorld Botanicals for exclusive commercial distribution of an extract of maca's active libido-enhancing compounds (Vecchio, 2007) . 2 1 W.R. Grace & Co was awarded a patent by the US PTO for its method of stabilising azadirachtin in solution and the stabilised solution itselfAzadirachtin is the active chemical compound contained in the neem tree. W.R. Grace & Co was also granted another patent by the EPO for a method for controlling fungi on plants also derived from the neem tree. While the former patent was upheld by the US PTO, the latter was eventually revoked by the EPO in 2005 (Bullard 2005 ). 2 Maca is a tuberous root used by the Andean people for centuries as a food crop and medicinal plant to enhance sexual performance and fertility in humans and livestock.
The reason that these disputes exist is that property rights in genetic resources and traditional knowledge are ill-dened in the North. Despite the South's contribution in providing necessary primary information as inputs in the R&D process, genetic information and traditional knowledge generally do not meet patentability requirementsnovelty and non-obviousnessand receive little or no protection. The failure to protect these contributions then results in a lack of investment in genetic diversity and traditional human capital, and in inecient ow of information across the sector.
3 This sub-optimal situation may lead to a permanent loss of both genetic diversity and traditional knowledge and therefore a loss of valuable source of improvement of human health.
4 Therefore the challenge for North and South is to coordinate their legal systems in a way that allows the South to be properly compensated for investing in genetic diversity and the associated human capital, and in supplying genetic material. In the absence of such coordination, bitter and costly legal disputes and underinvestment in essential inputs are likely to persist.
We decompose the production function for innovations in this industry into a three-part aair, involving the South's genetic resources and traditional knowledge as well as the North's technology. We further propose a clear delineation between genetic resources and traditional knowledge. We dene genetic resources to be the library of evolutionary information that is to be found in host countries of the South (Sarr et al. 2008 ). We dene traditional knowledge to be the search services provided that narrow the extent of the library that must be searched in order to identify a solution concept to a particular type of problem. Therefore, traditional knowledge is treated as a form of information (owing from traditional forms of human capital) held by the South that allows the North to truncate the search for new leads, i.e. to search over a smaller quantity of genetic resources. This bifurcation between the value of the base information and the value of a directed search over it has been indicated throughout the literature (Rausser and Small, 2000; Costello and Ward, 2006).
Our purpose in this paper is to analyse North/South interaction in the context of this non-integrated industry, as they bargain over the use of these three inputs. In particular, our aim is to determine the number and placement of property rights necessary within this industry to induce an ecient ow of information. What more is needed to get ecient contracting to occur within this industry? Should these rights solely protect traditional knowledge, or should they protect the genetic resource-based information alone, or both?
In Sarr and Swanson (forthcoming), we show that protecting genetic information alone creates the basis for ecient contracting in many cases. But, when traditional knowledge is present as a trade secret, i.e. as the South's private information, eciency arises under certain conditions only. In particular, when the North 3 The importance of giving rst innovators enough incentive to invest and innovate is particularly emphasized by Green and Scotchmer (1995) and Scotchmer (1996) because no inventions or discovery would be possible without their contribution. 4 Thus, to address this problem, Gehl Sampath (2005) suggests that the South's information should be protected in a similar way as the basic information provided by small and medium sized biotechnology rms to larger rms which use these inputs to process a nal product. It is thought that in the face of this incentive problem, the creation of 'informational property rights' (Swanson, 1995) could provide the South enough incentive to maintain genetic diversity and traditional knowledge, and grant access to her genetic resources. However, unless the property rights assigned domestically in the South are recognised across jurisdictions, the hold-up problem analysed in is likely to inhere.
proposes the contract (screening case), the emergence of an ecient outcome depends on the magnitude of the South's outside option aorded by the existence of an enforceable property right in the genetic resources.
Conversely, when the South proposes an ex ante contracti.e. before learning her private information eciency emerges as she is the residual claimant of the cooperative surplus and has therefore the proper incentive for ecient information trade with the North (signalling case). Eciency in this case hinges upon the assumption of risk neutrality and the possibility for the South to oer an ex ante contract. This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the set-up of the model. Section 3 analyzes the contracting outcome when genetic information is protected by property rights in the absence of traditional knowledge. In section 4, we investigate how the contractual terms change as we introduce traditional knowledge as the South's private information. Finally section 5 concludes the analysis.
The Model
This model builds upon the structure set out in Gatti et al. (2011) . There, the authors set out the basic structure of an industry spread out across two very dierent parts of the world (termed North and South).
These dierent parts of the world were distinct from one another in several important respects: endowments, industries and institutions. With regard to endowments, the South was heavily endowed with natural capital, and the North with technology (human capital). With regard to industries, the South was endowed with traditional information and industries, while the North was endowed with R&D. With regard to institutions, each sector had its own system of property rights and courts to dene and determine them. We examined in that paper the manner in which cooperation and conict might determine outcomes at the level of global bargaining between the regions.
In this paper, we wish to examine cooperation and conict at a more micro level. We wish to look at how the industries within these dierent regions (still termed North and South) might be able to achieve cooperation across this non-integrated industry. We also want to understand how the courts and property right systems act to determine how and whether the cooperative outcome is achieved, and the nature of that outcome.
Stylised Facts
As in Gatti et al. (2011) , we model the R&D industry in the biological sector as a non-integrated vertical industry of two stages as described in Appendix A.1. In the primary stage of the process, the rms from the South F S generate a ow of information originating in genetic resources and accumulated human capital. In a vertically integrated industry, this information would then be channelled to rms in the North F N where they would combine it with northern technology and marketing to place pharmaceuticals on the market to meet consumers needs in the North.
Through observation of natural diversity, F S may identify some biological activity in a plant variety and then use this knowledge to produce and market herbal medicines. Thus, by application of her traditional human capital h S (or traditional knowledge) to the genetic capital endowment g, F S identies essential information e embodied within herbal medicines H. The genetic material g is assumed to be present only in the South and, for purposes of this analysis, we assume that all innovations in this industry are derived from the capital stock g. F N , as the second innovator in this industry, is endowed with scientic capital h N which he is able to combine with g (and e) to produce a ow of innovations d (disembodied information, e.g. identication and isolation of active principles). This innovation d is then embodied within a pharmaceutical drug, which is then amenable to intellectual property right protection (IPR). This industry is depicted in Figure 2 and Figure 3 . products. This results from the control of access to the consumers in each region by the courts there, by reason of the enforcement of property right systems that exist in each region. In each region, there exists a property rights system that attempts to generate incentives for innovation by ensuring appropriation of the returns on investments in that region. Firms that identify genetic resources g and traditional knowledge have recognised property rights in the South. Likewise, the drug d developed by F N in the North has a recognised property right in it. Property rights conferred by a given region exist automatically only within that region's boundaries, and must be adopted and implemented by the other region to be given eect there. Court systems exist in each region (C t S and Ct N ) for enforcement of property rights. From previous rulings, the agents attempting to cooperate will have some common knowledge about both the likelihood of a court system protecting a given property right claim, and the consequences that ow from the court doing so (see section 3 below). from contracting under various assumptions regarding the property right and informational structure within the industry. To do so, we rst outline the anticipated outcomes from various bargaining processes, given the potential outcomes of cooperation and conict within the industry.
Assume rst that F N oers F S a contract to be granted access to g and h S in return for a transfer payment t. If successful negotiation is achieved, then F N can use a subset of genetic information (g N ) and traditional knowledge applied (h S ) to develop a patentable product.
In the cooperative outcome then, the two parties receive the following payos:
where π S and π N are increasing and concave in their respective arguments; c Now we turn to the chain of events that will ensue in the event that cooperation is not achieved. If no agreement is reached, F S considers placing her herbal medicines directly onto the market in the North. The problem with this is that (in absence of complete and certain protection of the embedded information) the marketing by F S will release some or all of the information it has produced. In response to such marketing (and by use of the released information), F N is able to develop a new drug built using the information contained in the
is the cost of developing the herbal medicineand F N gets nothing. On the other hand, if F N decides to invest in drug development, then a court in the North decides whether or not it has infringed F S 's right to its information. In this case a cooperative outcome is achieved (out of conict) by reason of court's decision regarding the respective property rights of the parties.
In the situation where the court becomes involved in the matter, there are three possible outcomes. First, the court in the North may nd that the rm from the South holds no property rights in the underlying innovation, in which case the rm from the South receives no compensation. Secondly, the court may nd that such rights exist but that no infringement of those rights has occurred, with the same result. Finally, the court may nd that the product released by F N infringes the rights of F S . Only in this last case is an ex post license for the sale of the drug required.
We will assume that a nding of infringement results in a situation where F S will share in the net revenues received in the marketing of the competing drug marketed by F N . We further assume that the share of prots appropriated by the Southern rm is a known parameter β, determined by reference to earlier court judgements regarding intellectual property infringement case law. We will also assume that both parties apply a commonly perceived likelihood (ξ) of a nding of infringement.
If F N is not found to have infringed the rights of F S then the drug created by F N is independently patented and marketed in the Northern market. In this case, the newly patented drug will competecompetition in dierentiated productsin the Northern market with the herbal medicine. The prots are then π
We will assume that the drug produced by F N based on F S 's information may or may not involve additional functions (due to value added by F N ). 5
Therefore, the non-cooperative expected payos can be stated to be:
5 The maca case is a good illustration. Local producers sell maca concoction on the local market and export a wide range of maca-based productsfrom powders and pills to jams and candiesto Japan, the United States, Germany, Belgium and Canada (Vecchio, 2007) . The production of these products are based on traditional knowledge. The maca derivatives developed and patented by the US rm PureWorld rely heavily on Andean traditional knowledge without acknowledging nor compensating the contribution of the TK holders.
where β is the share of F N 's prot captured by F S through ex post licensing or equivalently the damages paid by F N for infringement; andĝ S ,ĝ N andĥ S result from the rst order conditionswhich are omitted here.
In summary, the sequence of decisions, taking the industry through the options regarding cooperation and conict, may be set out as follows:
1. F S devotes resources to invest in TK h S and to nd genetic materials (e.g. medicinal plants) g containing useful information resulting in herbal medicine H.
2. F N oers F S a transfer payment t to grant her access to biological resources and TK used in the production of H. In short, we are using this sequential process to describe the parameters relevant to the industries choice between conict and cooperation, and how these parameters will determine a) whether coordination is achieved within the industry; and b) the distribution of rents that occurs under that cooperative solution. In our view, the industry should be able to achieve cooperation from the outset, and to generate a single innovation (d) that is placed onto the market in the North, without competition from any other product containing that innovation.
The importance of the alternative outcomes lies in their determination of the distribution of rents that results in the cooperative outcome.
Hence, if terms are not agreed via cooperation, then the industry is able to place competing innovations onto the market, and the courts will determine the outcome of this competition. The game structure above sets out all of the various possible outcomes that ow from this competition. And the initial contractual terms and the distribution of benets achieved, will depend upon how the parties view this entire process, the conictual outcomes and the prospect of various court ndings.
We now turn to examine how compensation for the South's various inputs (g and TK) will be determined within this process.
Compensation in a non-integrated Vertical Industry
The issue of compensation within vertical industries has been examined extensively within the economics literature (See Lafontaine and Slade, 2007 for a complete literature survey). The issues addressed in this literature concern the compensation received at the various levels of the vertical industry, depending upon the importance of incentivising inputs supplied at each level (Lafontaine and Slade 2001) , the importance of a property rights structure (Grossman and Hart 1986 ), the transactions costs of remaining non-integrated (Williamson 1985) and the costs of non-coordination. All of these issues are of course very important in the context of the industry we are considering, and we will therefore look at the problem of structure within a range of contexts.
Initially we are going to consider the industry in its most simplistic format: it will consist of two players, with only a single property right inhering in the product at the end of the industry (see diagram in Appendix A.1).
There will be no problems of information -and so no incentivising constraints. The agent at the end of the industry (Firm F N ) will be able to sell the nal product to consumers on account of this property right, and it is able to secure the required inputs from the earlier stages of the industry (Firm F S ) if it has the participation of that agent.
We argue that if there is full information and F N has the capacity to shape the terms of the contractbecause of its situation at the end of the vertical industry and its proximity to marketthe bargaining problem degenerates into a standard principal/agent problem where the agent F S has a weak bargaining position. The Management Science literature provides rationale for the use of the standard principal/agent framework. This literature has explored the division of labour and prots in a vertical industry with cumulative innovations involving large pharmaceutical rms specialised in developing and marketing new products and smaller biotech rms specialised in basic research. In this context, Lerner and Merges (1998) provide anecdotal evidence of cases where large pharmaceutical rms (such as Ciba-Geigy) exploited their stronger bargaining power to negotiate contracts that gave them almost total control over smaller biotech partners (e.g. ALZA Corporation). Rothaermel (2001) also provides ample evidence suggesting that pharmaceutical rms are in a strong bargaining positiondue to their specialized downstream assetsrelative to biotech rms they contract with. Furthermore, Kinukawa and Motohashi (2010) shows that pharmaceutical rms tend to extract more surplus than their biotech suppliers, in that the contract prices of biotechnologies have been lower than their market value due to the stronger bargaining power of the former.
3.1 Contracting genetic resources in the absence of traditional knowledge: Case of Symmetric information
We have described the situation in which the Firm F N is a monopsonist in a vertical industry, a problem rst analysed by Martin Perry (1978) . Perry examined the incentives for vertical integration, whereas we are considering the contracting process between the monopsonist and its suppliers within a vertical industry. In this situation the question to be examined is how the payment from the monopsonist to the supplier is determined.
We consider the case where the supplier has the option of integrating forward into the monopsonist's market in order to oer its inputs directly to consumers in direct competition with the nal product d.
In this section, we are assuming that F S has a potentially enforceable property right in g but that F N is a monopsonist purchaser of that input and the holder of enforceable property rights in d. In this situation, we believe that the monopsonist purchaser has the power to announce the terms of the contract on oer. This is because any oer made by the supplier is simply revealing her information.
6 The objective of F N then is to oer the minimum required payment to F S in order to acquire her participation in the supply of inputs g for the production of d. Note that we also make the assumption that traditional knowledge is absent so that h S will not feature in the payo functions.
Therefore, in this context, F N proposes to F S a contract (g N , t)access to F S 's genetic resources in return for a transfer payment tthat maximises his own prot subject to F S 's participation constraint, that is:
Proposition 1: Suppose rm F N oers a take-it or leave-it contract accepted by rm F S :
6 Although we are commencing our analysis with the symmetric information case, the presence of private information will turn out to be important in this analysis, and so there is no incentive for the supplier to announce potential contract terms, and so volunteer information to the monopsonist. dened as in (6) and (7).
2) The equilibrium payment t * increases in the likelihood that the court nds rm F N to infringe rm F S 's property right.
Proof 1: In the equilibrium, F N will set t to make the participation constraint binding. If that was not the case then F N could slightly decrease t, satisfy the constraint while increasing its prot. This would contradict the fact that we are in the equilibrium. The problem becomes:
The rst order condition yields the ecient solution where
The transfer payment is then given by:
Moreover it is straight forward to derive the following comparative static:
Discussion
The compensation problem here devolves to the outcome characterized by equations (6) and (7). Given our assumption that F N has the capacity to frame this contract (on account of its property right in the nal product d) the creation of a property right in genetic resources g addresses the distributional issues only to a very small extent. The maximum share received by F S in this framework is obtained when the probability of a nding of infringement by northern courts is equal to 1, that is ξ = 1. The courts in the North play an important role in the determination of the magnitude of the transfer in making these decisions regarding infringement.
F S
is compensated for its costs of supplying genetic resources in addition to its outside option which reects the 7 This is indicative of the meaning of the present legal disputes between North and South in the courts of the North. To the extent that northern courts disallow the conferment of exclusive marketing rights to rms of the North in drugs relying upon genetic resources from the South, they are implicitly recognising the exclusive rights to genetic resources in the South.
expected value of any products that might be marketed in competition with F N . When the genetic resource right is recognised, that payment then includes some potential return on F S inputs into the production of the joint product d. When the genetic resource right is not recognised, the payment to F S includes only the payment for entering the market with the herbal product.
In short, when F N initiates the contract, the rms are not really bargaining over the division of joint surplus; instead, F S is simply being compensated for its participation in the vertical industry (see Gatti et al. 2011 for a similar result). Compensation for participation includes the costs of supply as well as a payment for refraining from competition. Therefore, a property right in genetic resources is important for generating some recognition of the South's role in the vertical industry, but it does not have much impact on the distribution of the production surplus within that industry. 4 Compensating Traditional Knowledge -is a property right necessary?
In this section, we examine how the presence of traditional knowledge (TK) might inuence the contractual process and the compensation terms between the parties. We consider TK to be an informational input: private information held by the potential suppliers of g. Specically, we will assume that TK has the eect of informing F N about the most promising genetic resources for purposes of R&D. In this way, the quality of F S 's traditional knowledge lies in her ability to truncate the search, i.e. to target the most promising genetic resources, thus reducing considerably the number of resources to be searched (Costello and Ward, 2006) . We investigate here the contracting in regard to TK, where the knowledge about the genetic resources that are most useful for R&D, is F S 's private information and can only be acquired by F N via contracting.
Traditional Knowledge as Private Information
We now set out how this baseline analysis is altered by the presence of TK, i.e. the private information held by the rm in the South. We examine here the case where the North has the capacity to structure the contractual terms.
We say that F S holds traditional knowledge when she possesses information on the prospects of heterogeneous genetic resources in regard to their usefulness for R&D. For purposes of exposition, suppose F S has two types of information on the prospect that the genetic resources deliver a promising lead. There is a high prospect type θ with probability p and a low prospect type θ with probability 1 − p. High types are of higher value for two reasons: 1) they have a higher average value for producing information within the R&D process; and 2) they have a lower average cost when supplying information within the R&D process.
8 Thus, the usefulness of the genetic resources for purposes of information generation is F S 's private information. Together these assumptions constitute our denition of the economic meaning of TK.
We now specify the ways in which the existence of this private information will impact upon the contracting process. F N species the oered contract enabling direct access to F S 's genetic resources. A contract consists of access to F S 's genetic resources in return for monetary payment t. It is specied in terms of the dierent types of genetic resources available. A direct revelation mechanism is a menu of two contracts {(g
one for each type of resource.
An agreement will be signed if transaction costs are small enough, and the participation and incentive compatible constraints are satised for each type of resource. The participation constraints (or individual rationality constraints IR and IR) ensure that each type receives at least her expected reservation prot.
This is equivalent to
where
represents the prot dierential between the high and low type (i.e. the dierential value of her outside option within the non-cooperative setting).
Note that the participation constraints IR and IR are type dependent implying that the high type has better opportunities outside the proposed contract (larger expected reservation prot) than the low type. This specicity will lead to non-standard results.
The incentive compatible constraints respectively IC and IC ensure that each type is always better o revealing truthfully herself. 8 For example, the knowledge that these are high prospect genetic resources might both contribute to a better targeting of the resource-based information onto a specic problem (higher value of information) and also do so in a much reduced search process (lower cost of information). The incentive compatibility constraints respectively IC and IC can then be re-written as:
F N 's problem is then: (9), (12), (13) The problem can be re-written as follows:
subject to (10) , (11), (14), (15) This analysis leads directly to the following proposition, detailing the eects on contracting that result from the existence of private information. Proposition 2 establishes that the factor most important in determining the payo to F S is the impact, if any, of any endowment (genetic resources or traditional knowledge) upon her outside options.
Proposition 2:
When F S has private information about the most promising genetic resources for R&D purposes, F N may seek cooperation by oering a menu of self-selecting contracts {(g N ,t), (g N , t)} to screen among the types of genetic resources. These contracts are characterised by: 
, IR and IR are binding so that no information rent is given up to any type.
The supply of genetic resources is ecient for both types, i. As indicated above, the basic result is that the impact of TK (on contracting) depends primarily on its impact on the value of the outside option. In parts 1.2 through 1.4 of Proposition 2, we see that the determining factor is whether the incremental rent appropriable by the high type (V 0 )by selling her herbal medicine in the Northern market, i.e. under non-cooperationis less than or greater than the cost advantage appropriable via contracting, Φ.
We will now turn to the case where F S is able to make the oer to F N and then discuss the meaning of these results.
Traditional Knowledge and Information Rents
We have now analysed the nature of the contracting that would occur within this industry, given that traditional knowledge is treated as private information within a contractual relationship regarding genetic resource transfers.
The rst point to make concerns the importance of the attachment of TK to the genetic resource rightsfor purposes of reaching a negotiated resolution. Basically, the absence of any court-recognised rights in either TK or genetic resources (i.e. when ξ = 0) will result in the lowest valued outside option being available to the South. This represents the lower bound, and no additional value accrues to TK over that captured from the competitive marketing of the traditional medicine (H ). In short, without a property right being conferred upon both agents, there is no basis for bargaining over the division of joint surplus. The party without a property right is simply oered its participation costs.
On the other hand, if there is some prospect of recognition of an exclusive right to genetic resources (ξ > 0), then it is possible to add the value of private information to that of genetic resources. The importance of private information is that it might confer an information rent upon its holder. Our model departs from the standard prediction that informational advantage confers a rent upon the promising type only because the participation constraints are type-dependent. Whether F N gives up information rent and to which type depends instead upon the value of V 0 , i.e. the dierence between the outside option of the high type and that of the low type. When the high type enjoys a highly protable outside opportunity relative to the low type, the contract must oer her a large transfer. This contract must also reward the low type to prevent her from misrepresenting the quality of her information since the additional cost she incurs by lying, i.e. Φ(g If F S 's primary informational advantage lies in her supply costs rather than in her outside optionthat is, the dierential in reservation prot V 0 does not exceed the cost dierential between the high type and the low typethen the benet conferred by private information comes from the high type's ability to mimic the low type, taking advantage of the supply costs dierential (as in case 1.2 of Proposition 2). In this case, the high type is able to appropriate some informational rent by reason of the asymmetric information whereas the low type is excluded from the sharing of the surplus. contracts where both types of genetic resources receive their expected reservation prot; that is, no information rent is given away. This is because no agent has an incentive to misrepresent her type so that the symmetric information outcome (see section 3) can be implemented.
In sum, the fact that there exists private information on the genetic resources that are most promising may or may not alter the contractual terms oered to F S . So long as the private information does not impact the outside option in a substantial manner (as dened above in Proposition 2), the contract can replicate the complete information outcome. Then there are no informational rents to be appropriated by F S . On the other hand, if the outside option is signicantly aected by the private information, the contractual terms will be altered in one of the ways described above, and this may result in additional rents for F S accruing to either the low type or the high type information provider. These informational rents would create additional incentives 9 This informational rent is decreasing in g N . Thus an upward distortion in the supply of high quality genetic material g N would allow F N to minimise this informational rent. 10 It is important to recognise that the rent given up to the high type increases in g N , implying that a reduction in g N will help minimise this rent. Thus, there is an incentive for F N to distort its demand for low type downwards away from the ecient level g * N in order to minimise rent-sharing.
for investment in the provision of these resources to the R&D process, enhancing the eciency of the R&D process.
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Given that F S uses her private information to extract some informational rent, it is important to know whether this private information provides incentives to invest optimally in traditional knowledge. The answer will depend on the source of the high type advantage, i.e. the access cost advantage and the outside opportunity advantage.
When the high type's advantage derives from the cost of access, then she has strong incentive to invest in human capital to keep her edge and continue to capture informational rent. At the same time, if the low type wants to improve her position by narrowing her cost disadvantage, she too has to invest in TK. By contrast, if the high type's advantage stems from the outside opportunity dierential, whether she has incentive to invest in traditional knowledge, depends on the source of the dierential. If the advantage in the reservation prot comes from the quality of the information, then this will certainly induce human capital investment. However, if this dierential is only vaguely related to the quality of the information that enables to truncate the search then the production of TK is unlikely to be incentivised. This would be the case if for example the advantage in the reservation prot lies in the high type's marketing ability to target eectively consumers in the North.
The Role of Property Rights in Resolving Conict
We have been considering how property rights might be used to generate cooperative outcomes within a nonintegrated vertical industry, such as often exists within the life sciences. We nd that property rights are both important and unimportant in aiding cooperation and surplus-sharing.
The rst point is that a recognised right in genetic resources is critical to encouraging bargaining within this industry. Without a recognised and enforceable right in genetic resources, the contribution of the South is only recognised to the extent of its supply costs and its threat of entry. There is not an explicit term in the compensation formula recognising the inputs of South into joint production, unless there the courts of the North oer to enforce rights in g against rms from the North. Despite this, there is little enhanced sharing of product from the creation of such a right. The basis of compensation of such inputs continues to be primarily the minimum required compensation for participation by such suppliers.
The result is the converse in the case of TK. In the context of this input, it is very likely that some rentsharing can result, even without the presence of an explicit property right in TK. The fact that TK is private information is sucient to confer advantages upon F S , and alter the bargaining environment which determines the level of F S 's share of the surplus. The existence of a property right in genetic resource-based information 11 Informational rents may contribute to their own types of ineciencies, however, as eciency is lost whenever F S has an incentive to misrepresent herself to capture some information rent and appropriate some of the cooperative surplus. This places F N in the situation in which he will move away from productive eciency in order to minimise rent-sharing. That is, to minimise rent-sharing, F N has to decrease g N (in case of low V 0 ), and increase g N (in case of large V 0 ) away from the productively ecient levels, respectively g * N and g * N .
retains its importance as the value of the outside option remains dependent upon the enforcement of this right in the Northern market. If the court holds that F N has not infringed F S 's righti.e. if the drug is distinctive enough from the herbal medicine marketed in the Northern marketthen F S will receive little compensation under cooperation. If however, the court rules that F N has infringed the right, then F S will receive a substantial payo based on her ability to license her right after the court's decision. Since F S depends upon the underlying right to genetic resource information to protect its release of information on the market, this much is necessary to protect both.
12
In this way, the role of TK is likely to enhance the value of F S 's underlying genetic resources, but only if there is a potentially recognisable claim in those genetic resources to begin with. This indicates that it is not necessary for a property right to be conferred in everything of value which F S contributes to. It is only important to create a right in an output which F S is able to market independent of cooperation (i.e. in competition with F N ). Once that right is recognised, F S 's other contributions may be able to be channelled through the existing right in terms of its impacts upon the outside option. Essentially, F S 's private information acts as a trade secret which is revealed to F N only against due compensation and the willingness to pay for this secret increases with the usefulness of the information to F N . Keeping this information secret enables F S to extract some information rent and thereby appropriate part of the production surplus under the conditions discussed in section 4.1. In general, keeping traditional knowledge as private information might compromise eciency but favour the South as far as the distribution of prots is concerned.
Conclusion
This paper has analysed a simple model of the interaction between North and South in relation to the establishment of property rights to protect genetic resources and traditional knowledge. We have stylised the North as rich in human capital but in need of essential genetic resources and traditional knowledge only available in the South to make innovations in the life sciences industries. We examine the impacts upon the cumulative research setting of assigning a second property right to the resource-based information held by the rms in South. In doing so, we investigate how this can achieve eciency and discuss the implications for the division of the prot.
We show that the creation of a property right in genetic resources in the absence of traditional knowledge under complete information yields an ecient supply of resources. Crucial to the division of the joint prot is that this exclusive right be recognised by courts in the North. This right allows the genetic resources holder to market her productsderived from the protected genetic resourcesin the North, which gives her an outside option. When such right exists, the division of the prot depends on whether the rms in the North infringe this right. Note also that in this framework, the rm oering the contract will reap all the cooperative surplus.
So, a property right in genetic resources is crucial to bargaining, but not that important to determining the division of surplus. 12 It is straight forward to show that F S 's compensation increases with ξ.
On the other hand, when traditional knowledge is dened as the private information held by the South on the prospect of individual genetic resources to yield a successful search, its role in bargaining is the converse. In the presence of traditional knowledge, the rms in the South have various means of generating an additional return.
Either they can misrepresent the quality of their informationand hence attempt to generate an information rentor they can hope that the existence of promising resources increases the perceived value of their outside option. Any factor that increases the value of their outside optionor reduces the value of the Northern rms' outside optionincreases the credibility of the threat to compete (rather than cooperate) and hence enhances their payo under cooperation.
Critically, it is not necessary to establish a separate property right in traditional knowledge to appropriate this enhanced return. The granting of a single property right (to g) to the Southern rms is probably sucient to establish a channel whereby they are able to appropriate the value of their dierent types of contributions to the industry.
Essentially, we show that the capacity of Southern rms to share in the rents from the R&D sector to which they contribute depends on the existence of an independent property right in the genetic resources. This independent right gives them a greater outside option and establishes the baseline upon which contracting occurs, and hence creates the basis upon which Southern rms may demand compensation in line with their contribution. Importantly we also show that it is not necessary to have a property right in each and every thing in order to have more equitable contractual terms. Once each agent is possessed of a single right, this may be sucient to induce bargaining. Other valuable inputs may be able to earn their returns through association with the input in which a property right is recognised. Thus, we demonstrate thatto the extent that TK is private informationseparate property right is not necessary to earn a separate return on this input.
Overall, we can say very little about eciency in an industry such as this oneby denition an industry replete with government-protected monopolies lies within the realm of the second best. It does seem crucial that such industries should be subject to incentive systems that are able to adequately reward all agents supplying important inputs to production. We have shown that a privately organised industry that provides for a single property right at the end of the pipelinei.e. where marketing of the innovation occursis likely to reward essential suppliers by means of the lowest possible participation payment. This arrangement may not provide incentives for those agents to invest in the ongoing supply of those inputs in accordance with Hart and Moore (1990) . We have established that it is critical to create at least as many property rights as there are agents to incentivise the various private agents along the supply chain to bargain over and to distribute joint surplus. We have also shown that it is not as important to create as many property rights as there are inputs. Because the participation constraints are type dependent, the search for equilibrium requires to consider several cases. Let us rst represent the four constraints (10), (11) , (14) , and (15) in the space (V , V ).
The analysis is restricted to the region delimited by the two participation constraints and located above the 45 
F N would like to compensate the high type vs the low type no more than the outside option dierential V 0 .
However, because V 0 is so small, the high type can obtain a better compensation by lying to F N . If this happens the high type can potentially generate a cost saving of Φ(g N ) which is greater than the outside opportunity V 0 .
So, the high type has an incentive to misrepresent herself and receive an information rent. It follows that IR is slack while IC must be binding:
Besides, by lying the low type would incur an extra cost of access of Φ(g N ) that is greater than V 0 (since Φ > 0).
Therefore, she has no incentive to lie, which implies that IC is irrelevant and IR is binding: V = Π 
From the diagram, the prot maximizing point for F N is S 1 at which both the low type participation constraint IR and the high type incentive constraint IC are binding. We follow the same reasoning as in Case 1. The high type has no incentive to lie when V 0 (dierential in outside option between the two types) is greater than the saving on access cost she would get by mimicking the low type. Truthful revelation of her type will guarantee her to receive V 0 that she would obtain by not cooperating. This implies that IR is binding and IC is always satised. The low type, on the other hand faces the same situation as in Case 1, so she has no incentive to lie. Again, her participation constraint IR is binding and her incentive constraint IC always hold.
In this case, F N achieves the complete information outcome: V = Π Allocative eciency is reached for both types: F N will have an optimal access to the genetic resources from both types.
These allocations give rise to the following transfer schemes where no rent will be given up: 
